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Abstract
An epistemological foundation for cultural psychology is essential to neuro- and behav-
ioural sciences for the challenge psychological sciences must currently face: searching 
for an explanation of how a brain can become a mind and how individuals assign a sense 
to the world and their life. Biological systems are very likely determined by physical and 
chemical laws of spontaneous self-organization and endogenous constraints but, even if 
the major result of the Darwinian revolution is “the discovery that living species are their 
story”, the modern synthesis of the evolution theory adopted only continuist and gradual-
ist hypotheses. This nourished the analogy between the theory of natural selection and 
the theory of operant conditioning, thereby supporting empiricist associationism and the 
methodological positivism of behavioural and “classical” cognitive psychologists. Current 
scientific contributions provide evidence to the need for psychotherapy and psychopa-
thology of a new epistemological approach in order to connect research stemming from 
animal models, up to the most abstract levels of personal meaning. The complex system 
oriented approach, here described, called “post-rationalism”, shaped by a change initiated 
by evolutionary epistemology. The regulation of emotions initially develops within inter-
personal relationships and evolves during both phylogeny and ontogeny, according to 
complex self-organization processes, leading to the acquisition of Self-organizing abili-
ties and the construction of personal meaning. Endorsing the epistemological similarities 
of neo-Darwinism and behaviourism, and differentiating from this, the above mentioned 
approach, emphasises the fact that clinical and psycho-therapeutical practice must be 
founded on the laws of biological organisation: the ongoing activity of neurobiological 
systems, including the more abstract domains of thought and language.
IntroDuctIon
In Origins of stories [1], Jerome Bruner claims that “ 
…an event cannot, by definition, be inferred from a de-
terministic law. History overcomes necessity. And every 
story implies events that might never have happened…” 
With his thinking Jerome Bruner [2] laid the epistemo-
logical foundations for a cultural psychology essential to 
behavioural sciences and neurosciences, its main focus 
of investigation being the study of processes by which 
individuals assign a sense to the world and to their own 
life. The primary scope of human psychology is the 
“search for meaning”. In this way Bruner paves the way 
for a cultural or interpretative psychology, where the 
mind is the link between the individual and the exter-
nal world. Cultural psychology is meant to investigate 
how people, can create their own reality through narra-
tion, i.e. communicating and sharing with others what 
is “filtered” by each personal vision of reality. Accord-
ing to Bruner, culture is shaped by narration and self 
narrating. In the mentioned book, G. Bocchi and M. 
Ceruti provide a rich report of the contingent and un-
predictable changes that occurred during the evolution 
of culture and the physical universe. They discuss what 
in their – and my opinion – is the major result of Dar-
winian revolution: “the discovery that living species are 
their story” (the very same way we can state today that 
knowledge is a biological phenomenon), to conclude that 
the universe or mankind, rather than being at the end of a 
predetermined path, predictable or already known, are in 
the middle of a story. Through the study of fossils – spread 
throughout the entire planet - Darwin came to a new 
vision of life: during the course of evolution, any living 
phenomenon or being has a story that can be expressed 
as a process with a beginning and an end, a way of nar-
rating and being narrated.
The principal aim of this essay is to stress how the 
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post-rationalist perspective, considering a human 
knowing system as any other biological system with the 
same laws and processes, is also centred on the personal 
processes of narration and self-narrating, for the com-
prehension of the individual story. 
DArwInIsm AnD neo-DArwInIsm: 
the Interest for evolutIon
 Differently, empiricist associationism and the meth-
odological positivism of behavioural and “classical” cog-
nitive psychologists, is supported by the continuist and 
gradualist hypotheses adopted by the modern synthesis 
of Darwinian evolution theory. These rationalist cogni-
tivists often call “non scientific”, new epistemological 
approaches based on an evolutionary perspective and 
on the emerging studies in the field of behaviour and 
change of complex systems. Thus, biological systems 
are very likely determined by physical and chemical 
laws of spontaneous self-organisation, while changes 
in evolutionary and learning processes are guided by 
exogenous factors as well as internal and endogenous 
constraints. In order to fully understand the post-ra-
tionalist approach and the extent to which it is sup-
ported by current scientific debates, let’s move forward 
along the critical line drawn by M. Piattelli Palmarini 
and J. Fodor who denounced the lack of mutual knowl-
edge and communication between evolutionary biolo-
gists and psychologists. The two authors firmly believe 
in the analogy between the theory of natural selection 
and that of operant conditioning, in addition to the idea 
that change in evolutionary and learning processes is 
guided by exogenous factors as well as by internal and 
endogenous constraints, probably determined by auto-
organisational, physical and chemical laws! 
In the final section of the Origin of species [3] Charles 
Darwin refines his definition of evolution: the produc-
tion of a huge phenotypical diversity by the uniform and 
unceasing action of natural selection. Although other 
naturalists before him had posited the idea – with more 
or less detailed explanations – of living organisms con-
tinuously transforming in time, Darwin is unanimously 
considered the founder of evolutionism: a slow and con-
tinuous process of natural selection leads to changes 
among populations, i.e. evolution. Thomas Henry Hux-
ley [4] was the first author to express some doubts on 
Darwin’s views: in a letter to Darwin, he raised some 
objections against the pre-evolutionist principle natura 
non facit saltus (nature does not make leaps), according 
to which any gap or missing link in evolution can be 
solely ascribed to gaps in our knowledge. As G.L. Boc-
chi and M. Ceruti emphasize, Huxley’s suggestion was 
only marginally received: the germs of pluralism contin-
ued to be constrained by a strongly continuist concep-
tion of the time of evolution. In his article Evolution: 
the modern synthesis (1942), Huxley coined the defini-
tions of “evolutionary synthesis” and “modern synthe-
sis” [5-8]. The 1960’s gave way to the development of a 
neo-Darwinist gene-centred theory according to which 
the relation among different areas of research was in-
terpreted in a very restrictive way, thereby accentuat-
ing continuist and gradualist hypotheses, increasingly 
focusing on the micro-evolutionary processes that can 
be observed in a laboratory, yet neglecting macro-evo-
lutionary phenomena, considered to be deducible at a 
micro level [4-6, 9-14]. 
More recently, along the same line of reasoning of 
both What Darwin got wrong and neo-Darwinism, M. Pi-
attelli Palmarini and J. Fodor [15] underlined “the im-
portant analogy between the account of the fixation of 
phenotypes that Darwin offered and the “learning the-
oric” account of the acquisition of “behavioural reper-
toires” promoted by H.B.F. Skinner, a father of behav-
iourism”. Interestingly enough - and accordingly with 
the point of view here proposed - the above mentioned 
authors maintain that the two theories are identical. In 
their opinion, in the attempt to explain how learnt be-
haviours can be acquired, Skinner formulated and sup-
ported a theory where the associationism of British em-
piricists (“learning is the formation of habits”) merges 
with the methodological positivism of some psycholo-
gists like Watson [16] and philosophers like Dewey 
[17] (“scientific explanations should avoid dealing with 
unobservable phenomena such as mental states and 
processes). According to this type of psychology the or-
ganism must be treated as a “black box” and learning as 
the result of “stimulus-response” associations: this path 
leads us to the critical remarks on classic cognitivism 
[18, 19, 21] and to their implications for the epistemo-
logical tenets of psychotherapies and of the theories of 
mind and knowledge.  
Assuming only a single continuous and univocal cor-
respondence between gene configurations and overall 
fitness of the organism means to neglect the complexity 
of developmental trajectories as one of the many sourc-
es of internal constraints, such as the role of the genomic 
imprinting [25] and of the epigenetic factors [26] or the 
impact of the “noise of development”. This is a defini-
tion used by Lewontin [24] to refer to the microscopic 
random events that occur at all levels, from single cells 
to tissues (making even identical twins not exactly iden-
tical [27-29]) and to point to the existence of internal 
fluctuations, influencing the course of phenotypic evo-
lution both before the effects of ecological variables 
and independently of the latter. It is interesting to see 
how these phenomena are fully coherent with a post-
rationalist view of personal knowledge, which can be 
considered as any other living system. They are rec-
ognised in an occurring and shared approach in terms 
of the theories of complexity [30] as organisationally 
closed, in that they tend to privilege the maintenance 
of their organisation (identity) over their adaptation to 
the environment. 
Stephen Jay Gould suggests going back to Darwin 
and re-focusing on the organism as a whole: “Too often, 
the adaptationist programme gave us an evolutionary 
biology of parts and genes, but not of organisms (the 
same way behaviourism and classic cognitivism offer 
fragmented simplifications of the human mind)” [31]. 
According to Gould and Lewontin the adaptationist 
programme was wrong in its attempt to classify an or-
ganism on the basis of some “characters” that must be 
proved as ideal. Such an approach is far too reduction-
ist and is at risk of losing sight of what really matters: 
the organism in its environment and in its constrained 
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historical evolution. From the basic gene level, Gould’s 
attention is then shifted to the organism’s intermediate 
level, focusing on other “constraints” by using architec-
tural metaphors, in an analogy with Venice’s San Marco 
Cathedral’s decorative spandrels(1) on the constrictions 
that make evolution limited and no longer omnipotent, 
historically determined by contingencies and not free to 
float in the randomness of variations towards optimal-
ity. In 1997 Gould publishes two more significant arti-
cles: Darwinian fundamentalism and Evolution: the pleas-
ures of pluralism. His ideas are appreciable also when he 
states that adaptationism must be replaced by a plu-
ralistic approach, emphasising Darwin’s statement that 
“natural selection was the major, but not single cause of 
all modifications” [3, 33]. 
In line with the same considerations, in the mid 
‘90s, starting from words like “evolution” and “devel-
opment” (processes intended as the two faces of the 
same medal), the expression “evo-devo” is coined to 
indicate a true revolution [34, 35]. This emphasises 
how the filters (constraints) internal to development – 
which neo-Darwinism tried so obstinately to stay away 
from – are at the centre of evolution, that is essentially 
the evolution of the vector that links genes with phe-
notypes: evolution is the evolution of ontogeny! The 
whole process of development, from the fertilized egg 
to the adult individual, modulates the phenotypical ef-
fects of geno-typical changes, therefore “filtering“ the 
phenotypical options among which ecological variables 
have any chance to make a selection. All this is very 
close to the phenomenon of self-organisation, (crucial 
to the post-rationalist definition of personal meaning or-
ganization) a notion that describes how living systems 
organise themselves and operate to preserve their sys-
temic identity/integrity, as a result of basic evolution-
ary constraints [19, 36]. According to the evo-devo ap-
proach, a mono-dimensional theory of evolution is not 
appropriate: there are multiple levels of regulations that 
influence the expression of genes at different stages of 
development. The scope of this article does not include 
an exhaustive dissertation on these positions, which are 
still very controversial and not fully endorsed by most 
scientists. We suggest a further consultation of Piattelli 
Palmarini and Fodor’s work who keep the debate alive 
and recommend not taking the neo-Darwinian explana-
tion of evolution for granted. 
the emergIng stuDIes In the fIelD
of behAvIour AnD chAnge
of comPlex systems
What really matters to us here is to observe how mod-
ern biology, on which our psychological perspective is 
based, has fully embraced the notions of non-linearity, 
multiple biological sources and levels of internal con-
straints on possible phenotypes; the generally accepted 
idea is that the evolved phenotypes incorporate infor-
mation on the ecological systems, in which they have 
developed, together with information on the internal 
organisation of the carrier organisms, just as a human 
knowing system incorporates its story and creates a vi-
sion of itself and the world, from the very first moments 
of its life. 
Over the last twenty years a new theoretical and 
clinical approach to medicine is being developed, which 
may be conducive to a synthesis, taking an evolution-
ary or Darwinian perspective as the general reference 
framework, as the “principle unifying the study of liv-
ing beings, including diseases and human health”. To 
say it with Corbellini [37-39]: “The evolutionary stand-
point implies that any clinician should raise at least two 
questions «Why does one get sick?» and «Why has this 
person become sick right now and why in this way?», 
thus shifting attention from the immediate causes that 
are experimentally studied to the remote ones, and to 
the fact that the patient’s individuality is an irreducible 
evidence; it is essential to keep into account the his-
torical constraints that influence the risk of getting sick 
both on a phylo- and ontogenetical level. “The causes 
of diseases are harmful not in themselves, but because 
of the incongruence between the body’s physiology and 
the surrounding context: this dissonance or mismatch is 
manifested by the interactions between the individual 
genetic/epigenetic constitution and the contingent en-
vironmental factors [40]. It is with great interest and 
enthusiasm that we report such a theoretical novelty 
that comes to characterise medical thinking and that 
leads us to observe medicine from an historical per-
spective. The standpoint of Darwinian or evolutionary 
medicine entails a paradigm shift in the approach to-
ward different domains of medical sciences: this may 
have some major repercussions on teaching practices 
and may contribute to the training of a new breed of 
physicians that are capable of a broader understanding 
of epistemology and psychology. We are heading for an 
increasingly tailor-made health care, in the belief that 
each one of us is the carrier on an individual genome, 
with a personal evolutionary history and moving to-
wards a social and epigenetic trajectory that emphasises 
the uniqueness of each individual. The doctor-patient 
relationship must also be framed, understood and re-
vised in light of evolutionistic considerations [40]”. 
All this in my opinion cannot be separated from any 
current psychological theory on change and from any 
clinical and psycho-therapeutic practice, the latter in 
particular being inextricably related to biological phe-
nomena, including those that pertain to development 
and knowledge as well as to the more abstract domains 
of thought and language.
(1)…You decide to build a church by mounting a circular dome on four rounded arches that meet at right angles. I’ll accept that as an analog of 
adaptation; that’s an engineering design that works. But once you do that, you have four tapering triangular spaces where any two arches meet at right 
angles. The spaces are called spandrels. They’re spaces left over… No one can claim that the spandrels under the dome are adaptations for anything. I 
suppose it’s a good idea to put some plaster there - otherwise the rainwater is going to come in – but the fact that they’re tapering triangular spaces is a 
side consequence of the adaptive decision to mount the dome on four arches. It’s space left over. It’s a side consequence; it isn’t an adaptation in itself.” 
[32]….. just as with the human brain: most of what the brain does are probably spandrels – that is, the brain got big by natural selection for a small set 
of reasons having to do with what is good about brains on the African savannas. But by virtue of that computational power, the brain can do thousands 
of things that have nothing to do with why natural selection made it big in the first place, and those are its spandrels [32].
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the brAIn-mInD relAtIon 
Today the long-standing issue of the brain-mind rela-
tion can be investigated with very sophisticated technol-
ogy: the mind is “the supreme property, conquest of the 
living matter” [41]. Throughout the course of develop-
ment of almost all species, the brain has gone through 
a progressive increase in volume, “but even more im-
portant for achieving functional performance was the 
surface extension operated by the cortical layer’s folding 
into the creases known as gyruses… in Homo sapiens, the 
most advanced of primates, other factors have come into 
play, amplifying enormously the brain mantle’s perfor-
mance. The cultural heritage has been added to the ge-
netic make-up. The huge power of these two forces is at 
the base of the human phenomenon bound to open infi-
nite spaces in the material field of the universe and in the 
abstract and equally infinite domain of thought ”[42].
H. Maturana begins his article on the Biology of cog-
nition [36] stating that “Man knows and his capacity to 
know depends on his biological integrity; he knows that 
he knows”. Later on A. Damasio [43] wrote that even 
an amoeba knows, but before coming to know that it 
knows, we have to proceed along the whole phylogenet-
ic scale, the whole human evolution”. In E. Boncinelli 
[44] we read: “With the human species, biological evo-
lution has gone beyond itself and has reached a sort of 
paradox…we can consider ourselves released from the 
conditionings of our biology, but we should not forget 
that the freedom we enjoy is a conquest and a nice gift 
of our own genes, a gift that has not been given to squids 
nor to frogs”. Several authors clearly underline how the 
growing complexity of the brain progressively required 
higher and higher levels of organisation: emotion, the 
first feelings or knowing (i.e. the first link or relation 
between an organism and the environment) is the basis 
of the most elementary cognition or knowledge. Con-
sciousness -a self-reflective ability reserved to humans- is 
nothing but the highest form of further self-organisation 
and ordering, essential to an organism’s survival. “Con-
sciousness begins when the brain acquires the power…
to tell a wordless story that goes on within the body’s 
boundaries…and I suspect that what made conscious-
ness prevail through evolution was that the knowledge of 
the feelings caused by emotions, is essential for the art of 
living…so that we could know life” [43].
W. James [45] defined consciousness as a skill that is 
developed when the nervous system becomes too com-
plex to regulate itself. In other words, consciousness is 
like an emerging brain’s property that takes control of the 
nervous system. ”The interaction of consciousness with 
brain mechanisms seems to be bi-directional: conscious-
ness stands at the top of the hierarchical ladder made of 
sub-atomic particles, atoms, molecules, cells and brain 
circuits and is in charge of performing the organising 
function and directing the activity of all the sub-cellu-
lar, cellular and supra-cellular entities that make up the 
brain… The world, the way we perceive it with its col-
ours, smells and sounds, is a fruit of our brain” [42]. 
In order to not waste a wealth of information existing 
between the proximate genotypic level and the ultimate 
phenotypic level of an organism, we advocate a foun-
dational view that focuses on similarities in brain, be-
haviour, and various basic psychological features across 
mammalian species. In agreement with Panksepp [46, 
47], we embrace an approach that suggests the poten-
tial to link the emerging discipline of evolutionary psy-
chology to its parent scientific discipline like biochemistry, 
physiology, molecular genetics, developmental biology 
and the neuro-scientific analysis of animal behaviour, 
to stress that the biological organisation is the ongo-
ing activity of neurobiological systems [48]. The contri-
bution of neuro-sciences has spread out to areas such 
as affects regulation, mentalisation, development of 
the Self, consciousness and language, thus providing 
evidence to theories that in the past were confined to 
philosophy. Today we are beginning to see more clearly 
the once mysterious mechanisms that organise and give 
sense to all the information about the external world 
and the events occurring in it. Let’s take the case of 
brain plasticity: different studies focusing on neural 
connections showed that the afferent cells, after being 
damaged, are able to generate new connections based 
on a process known as synaptic re-organization [49, 
50]. Alleva and Francia [51] studied neuro-trophins like 
the NGF (nerve growth factor) and the BDNF (brain-
derived neurotrophic factor) implied in neurogenesis, 
differentiation, growth and maintenance of selected 
central and peripheral neuron populations during devel-
opment and adulthood. Neurotrophins, together with 
the HPA (hypotalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis), play a 
relevant role in modulating brain plasticity and coping 
behaviours, particularly during the critical stages of on-
togenesis, i.e. when the brain is very sensitive to external 
stimulation: early life events, such as psycho-physical 
stress, influence the NGF and BDNF levels and cause 
a dis-regulation of the HPA axis. Early life experiences 
can therefore affect brain development and contribute 
to inducing differences from individual vulnerability to 
stress, up to causing psychiatric illnesses. A break in the 
mother-offspring relation generates neuroendocrine, 
neurochemical and behavioural alterations in the adult 
organism, but we are still unable to fully understand 
the basic mechanisms underlying these changes [52]. 
Fluctuations in the levels of neurotrophic factors during 
the critical stages of development may cause long term 
changes in brain plasticity and an increased vulnerabil-
ity to aging and psychopathology [53-57]. 
To say it with Siegel [58] and Feinberg’s words [59, 
60], the human mind seems to emerge from the ac-
tivities of the brain, whose structures and functions 
are directly influenced by interpersonal experiences, 
and by the processes that modulate energy and in-
formation flows inside the brain and between differ-
ent brains, within the interactions between internal 
neuro-physiological processes and environmental 
phenomena. The development of brain structures 
and functions depends on how experiences – particu-
larly those related to increasingly frequent and com-
plex interpersonal relations – influence and shape the 
genetically determined maturation processes of the 
nervous system throughout phylogenetic evolution: 
the human “connections/relations” shape the devel-
opment of the nervous circuitry that is the founda-
tion of the mind.
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the “cognItIve revolutIon” AnD the
Post-rAtIonAlIst APProAch
Today the major challenge facing neurosciences and 
all the psychological disciplines seems to be the attempt 
to understand how brain structures can generate the 
consciousness of the Self, how the brain is able to per-
form an abstract function, starting from a concrete ac-
tivity. Starting from speculations that have been widely 
debated from the very dawn of philosophical thinking, 
Denton [61] makes an assumption that appears to be 
very close to the post-rationalist view focused on com-
plex systemic processes: consciousness seems to have 
progressively manifested throughout animal evolution 
in the form of “primal emotions” such as hunger, thirst, 
need for air, sexual drive (and perhaps later certain mo-
tivational systems such as playing, cooperation and all 
those activities matching and specialising interactive 
skills and needs), i.e. all those pressing forms of acti-
vation-arousal that are highly functional to the survival 
of an organism and that push it to act. Denton’s as-
sumption that primal emotions are the first emergence 
of primary consciousness leads him to a deeper consid-
eration of Damasio’s idea [43] that “emotion and the 
experience of emotion are the direct expressions of the 
highest level of bio-regulation in complex organisms”; 
emotions and the development of their regulation pro-
cesses drive the Self towards increasingly complex sys-
temic functional states [55, 62, 63]. 
The post-rationalist approach mainly takes shape with 
the work of V.F. Guidano [63-65], with the expansion 
of the traditional epistemological associationist empiri-
cist perspective and the elaboration of a psychology of 
the self that embraces cybernetics, systems theory, and 
artificial intelligence (i.e. the forefront of the “cognitive 
revolution” burst in the 70’s and 80’s in the Anglo-saxon 
world). Guidano was one of the major theoreticians and 
spokesmen of the epistemological change that occurs 
making knowledge from the point of view of he who possesses 
it a method for psychotherapy and a conceptual model 
to explore individual development and knowledge. The 
“post-rationalist” attribute introduced by Guidano him-
self at the end of the 80’s hinted at a new way to intend 
psychology, based on the recognition of individuals’ ir-
reducible characteristic of constructing meanings. He 
pointed to an approach rooted in the so called cogni-
tive revolution, viewing epistemology as the founding 
discipline of the clinical theory and practice of a new 
scientific psychology. Instead of empiristically consider-
ing cognition as a system of hierarchically ordered be-
liefs that guide people’s actions and emotions, Guidano 
and Mahoney [65, 66] regarded cognition as a process 
corresponding to the “interiority” of individuals and 
explored the active role that each subject plays in the 
construction of his reality. For a scientific investigation 
of the mind (that does not neglect the study of interior-
ity), knowledge had to be intended as an active, adap-
tive and historical process, conducive to the creation 
of certain structures – or theories – that living beings 
generate during the course of their interaction with the 
environment.
Evolutionary epistemology [67, 68] based itself on a 
vision of man intended as an organism able to actively 
order his reality through the production of theories 
whose conservation or elimination is ruled by natural 
selection. In his vision of the individual, Campbell [67] 
emphasised the feature of interior self-regulation that 
is intrinsic to the internalisation of theory selection and 
conservation processes, in the same way that Darwin 
had done with genes. Yet Campbell’s analysis of person-
al autonomy was still strongly dependent on the neo-
Darwinian view of the organism/environment relation: 
a subject that traditionally was approached by consider-
ing natural selection as a specifier of structural changes 
in the organism, regarding evolution as the optimisation 
of adaptation to the environment (continuist/gradualist 
hypotheses). The shift from structuralist cognitivism to 
post-rationalist psychology was shaped by a change ini-
tiated by evolutionary epistemology. This point of view 
was totally overturned in the early 80’s by two Chilean 
biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela 
[36, 69], who pushed the evolutionary interpretation 
into the internal dynamics of animal groups and into 
the history of structural transformations and environ-
mental changes. The founding notion is that an organ-
ism and its environment, change in an interdependent 
fashion: unit-environment relations can therefore be 
maintained only if the autonomous unit – the system 
– is able to generate, within its own organisational con-
straints, levels of reference that are suitable to coping 
with environmental change. 
In the early 80’s a discrepancy was becoming increas-
ingly evident between the logic “linearity” of descriptive 
psychiatry and the multifaceted “complexity” of human 
experience that would be encountered in clinical prac-
tice; while cognitivists and relational therapists were 
working at an integration of the developmental hypoth-
eses focused on the interface between family and indi-
vidual processes. The interdisciplinary convergence that 
leads to the approaches in terms of complexity [30, 63] 
embraced 2nd cybernetics, irreversible thermodynamics, 
evolutionary pluralism, cognitive science, evolutionary 
or natural epistemology, etc., radically transforming 
the traditional relation between observer and observed. 
This made it possible to elaborate a constructivist epis-
temology: rather than as the active and autonomous 
construction of a system that progressively models 
its internal order, starting from a flow of variable and 
unpredictable stimuli, while defining its specific indi-
viduality and identity “…this gradually takes shape in 
the course of individual development, and…each one 
of us, though living in an ‘objectively’ shareable social 
reality, actively constructs ‘from inside’ at very articu-
lated levels of individual perceptive order, his absolutely 
unique and exclusively subjective point of view” [63]. 
The metaphor of a man-scientist, who generates theo-
ries – followed by Popper’s disciples –, is then followed 
by that of the observer, who by means of observational 
processes, constructs an order of reality, that reflects his 
own perceptive organisation (self-reference): Everything 
said, is said by someone [70].
The studies on self-organized systems support the 
introduction of a new methodological perspective in 
cognitive sciences, such as the one described. Even if 
the concept of self-organisation, common in biological 
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systems, is differently considered among the scientific 
debate, is here considered as a simple spontaneous pro-
cess that occurs in complex systems. In order to explain 
how an organism generates a certain meaning, a new 
epistemological framework consists in the construction 
of a mechanism that is able to produce a given behav-
iour, resulting from the internal coherence of its opera-
tions, i.e. a specific mental state. This approach – that 
can be defined “constructivist” – is different from the 
predictive model of physical sciences (rationalist be-
havioural and cognitive), mainly founded on anticipa-
tion and prediction according to rational principles. 
Hence, the definition of post-rationalism, to indicate 
the rejection and overcoming of any linear determin-
ism, of any trust in a single and absolute scientific truth, 
which is the same for everyone, in favour of a pluralistic 
and multiple interpretation of every perspective. In our 
clinical practice, rather than accurately predicting the 
person’s cognition in that specific instant, as indicated 
by a prediction-based approach, it could be more use-
ful and explicative to reconstruct the internal dynamic 
of an individual that is able to give meaning to a set of 
events according to his personal coherence.
This is how Guidano arrives at the formulation of the 
notion of personal identity, intended as a hierarchical 
organisation of knowledge, emotions, perceptions and 
memory, a true structural theory of the Self and of the 
conscious world, where past, present and future events 
are connected in a sort of continuum going from nor-
mality to psychopathology. Infancy, childhood, adult-
hood and senescence are the different stages of the irre-
versible development of individual life, characterised by 
their organisational, biological, affective and cognitive 
peculiarities that participate in the construction, main-
tenance and change of personal meanings. During the 
course of individual development, cognitive processes 
are articulated in an ordered set of sub-systems of reac-
tions and meanings that make up identity, in a specific 
self-referential process of construction of self identity. 
According to the approach described thus far and in 
line with the consequent epistemological interpreta-
tion, current experimental evidence seems to support 
the possibility to bridge the gap between clinical and bi-
ological psychology and the related animal models; the 
evolutionary role of the processes of emotional self-reg-
ulation is underlined in light of the shared recognition 
of human species’ interactive nature, and of the role of 
biological regulators played by the early relational pro-
cesses experienced during individual development, as 
proven by multi-disciplinary studies [51, 62, 71].
the PrImAcy of emotIons AnD theIr
regulAtIon
In agreement with post-rationalist cognitivism, which 
emphasises – differently from classical cognitivisms – 
the primacy of emotions over cognition, emotions are 
the central processes of brain activity. Moreover, the in-
dividual’s abilities to organise them (these abilities de-
rive at least in part from the early experiences of attach-
ment/separation) directly influence how the mind inte-
grates different experiences and reacts to subsequent 
stressful situations. The mind is a complex system able 
to coordinate and organise its activities according to dif-
ferent mechanisms that are its self-regulation processes, 
in turn strictly related to the modulation of emotions. 
This process provides for the regulation of energy and 
information flows by the modulation of arousal states 
and the attribution of meaning to the cognitive repre-
sentations derived from experience. The regulation of 
emotions initially developed in the framework of inter-
personal relationships and evolved during phylogeny 
in a complex process of self-organisation that lead to 
the acquisition of Self-organising abilities [72]. By rec-
ognising the interactive nature of the human species, 
we can confirm the evolutionary role that emotional 
self-regulation processes and biological regulators play 
in the relational processes throughout individual devel-
opment. Reciprocity is perceived as a key and ordering 
element for development, as emerged from the vast re-
search conducted on groups of anthropomorphic pri-
mates [54, 62, 73-75]. 
If knowledge is seen as a self-organising process, the 
marked propensity to structure an intense emotional 
reciprocity with care givers appears as the ontological 
constraint at the root of any possible ordering of experi-
ence, thus underlining the organisational and regulatory 
role played by emotional and affective processes – pri-
marily those of attachment and detachment – during 
the course of individual development. The attachment 
system is biologically pre-programmed to enable the 
survival of animal species at growing levels of complex-
ity and duration up to human beings: the functions of 
attachment are not confined to childhood, but rather 
characterise the affective styles in adulthood and ac-
company humans throughout their entire life [76, 77]. 
Guidano distinguished some different categories of at-
tachment styles that are shaped throughout individual 
development; his idea was that the maintenance of the 
organisational attachment patterns ensures, on one 
hand, the continuity of one’s internal coherence and on 
the other, an increasingly articulated self-referentiality 
of cognitive processes. Starting from the earliest phases 
of development, the quality of interaction is integrat-
ed with the biological features and abilities emerging 
through the different phases of development. From an 
emotional standpoint, the child begins to know and 
recognize himself starting from the earliest basic sensa-
tions [63]. During the course of neuronal development, 
such basic sensations must be specifically connected to 
perceptions so that actions can be perceived as early 
individual emotional experiences. An emotion is a 
complex process that implies the integration of many 
biological and experiential components and that orients 
the quality of cognitive development, which in turn will 
continue to influence the emotion in a complex interac-
tive process running through one’s entire life.
meAnIng Is the overAll 
self-orgAnIzIng AbIlIty
If the ordering of the world cannot be separated from 
our being there, then to exist means to know: meaning 
is the way existence can be experienced and evaluated. 
Meaning is part and parcel of the overall self-organising 
ability. In the stream of the evolutionary process, the 
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flow of one’s affective and psycho-physiological modula-
tions is perceived as a sort of recursivity, recognised and 
assessed in a coherent fashion as unitary and continu-
ous in time, through the structuring of basic ordering 
categories, able to produce (in an autopoietic and self-
referential fashion [36]) and to assimilate consistent 
experiences [78] on which one’s own sense of identity 
can be built. The qualitative aspects of this search for 
coherence depend on the interactive structure of hu-
man experience, where the sense of Self is linked to the 
experience of being part of others’ consciousness (self-
esteem). Apparently, with the emergence of abstract-
reflexive abilities, primates’ tendency to fight for high 
social ranking has evolved into a matching level of more 
abstract self-referentiality, i.e. the need to preserve self-
esteem. During the course of the evolutionary process, 
the construction of the organisation of Personal Iden-
tity, i.e. of the set of personal meaning systems, depends 
on the role played by the interactions with significant 
others (attachment-separation processes).
Parallel to the emotional processes, attention has been 
focused on the study of cognitive processes that are sec-
ondary to the emotions they are rooted and built upon 
[79]. “In the field of evolutionary psychology and psy-
chopathology, emotions and their modulations are con-
sidered as tightly intertwined processes: emotions are 
regulated while at the same time they perform regulatory 
functions… any processing of information is based on 
emotion, meaning that emotion is the energy that di-
rects, organizes, amplifies and modulates the cognitive 
activity while constructing its experience and expression” 
[80]. In accordance with Siegel, we can consider emo-
tion as a system of meaning evaluation and the brain as 
a complex system consisting of neural circuits that “must 
possess some mechanisms making it possible to deter-
mine which excitation profile can be useful or neutral or 
harmful; in order to coordinate its functions, the system 
must be able to attribute values and meanings [58]. The 
idea of complexity is applied to the study of evolution-
ary paths in an effective synthesis between attachment 
theories and those of Piaget’s school on cognitive devel-
opment, up to the current contribution of cognitive sci-
ences, the first among others being those of P. Fonagy et 
al. [81-83] on the development of meta-cognition skills, 
(i.e. the ability to “observe” events and phenomena from 
the point of view of others). This ability is founded on 
the development of mentalisation skills (self-reflexive 
and interpersonal), i.e. the process through which chil-
dren learn to understand others’ minds as well as their 
own; as a consequence, the affective quality of the child’s 
relationship with the care giver determines the individu-
al sense of Self and the ability to discriminate between 
internal and external reality. The ability to modulate af-
fective states is equally strictly related to mentalisation: 
it thus appears reasonable to assume that the ultimate 
goal of attachment is to produce a representational sys-
tem that evolved as an aid to survival, in that it ensures 
the development of the brain structures useful for social 
cognition and to provide the individual with the neces-
sary tools to cooperate with others. Attachment seems to 
work as one of the main organisers of brain and human 
mind development [70, 84-86]. Damasio makes a dis-
tinction between “nuclear consciousness”, the simplest 
form that gives the organism a momentary sense of Self 
in the here and now, and “extended consciousness”, a 
biologically more complex phenomenon characterised 
by different levels of organisation that evolves through-
out the whole lifespan of the organism, participating in 
the continuity that preserves and maintains the personal 
sense of identity. The reader will recognise an assonance 
with what W. James, followed by V.F. Guidano and his 
post-rationalist approach, described on the flow of con-
sciousness as the continuous reciprocity between “I and 
Me”, i.e. the immediacy of experience and one’s unceas-
ing explanation [64, 87].
A human cognitive system should therefore be intend-
ed as a form of self-referentially organised complexity, 
whose primary attribute is its very self-organising abil-
ity. Human experience is nothing but the product of this 
self-organisation process that in evolutionary terms has 
gone on for millions of years. The capacity to regulate 
emotions and their relevant activation states, through 
so called “processes of affective regulation”, plays a cru-
cial role in the internal activities of an individual: many 
psychiatric conditions can be seen as disorders of these 
regulatory processes… this is the reason why some thera-
peutic approaches aimed at different levels of brain and 
mind activity can be used to help patients to acquire 
more balanced and functional forms of self-regulation; 
the patient-therapist relationship can provide “external 
constraints” (in addition to biological modifications [88] 
that contribute to modifying personal self-organising 
skills and abilities). The ordering of reality is a principle 
that is inherent to the dynamics of life itself, which has 
taken on growing forms of complexity and self-organisa-
tion as humans have proceeded along the evolutionary 
ladder up to the acquisition of self-determination and 
plasticity of individual human processes. Reality – like 
the qualities and features of self-organisation – is the 
product of the relation that the system establishes with 
its environment: it pertains not only to the biological 
characteristics, but also to their interaction [72]. 
In Guidano’s work [63, 64] we find one of the most 
promising applications of the notion of self-organisation 
in cognitive and clinical psychology: the interdepend-
ence between self-knowing and self-ordering implies 
that the generation and the assimilation of any informa-
tion are regulated by the personal identity patterns that 
have been structured up to that moment, thus making a 
unitary and coherent dimension of experience possible. 
Moreover, Guidano emphasises how self-organisation 
also means that any pressure for change, emerging in a 
subject from the continuous integration of experience, 
is subordinated to the preservation of the “experiential 
order” (personal meaning) as the basis of the continuity 
and coherence with which one’s Self is perceived. Atten-
tion is increasingly focused on a type of active interiority 
that is alive and builds its world through a ceaseless effort 
of interpretation, enabling an inter-subjective negotia-
tion of the meanings assigned to events and behaviours. 
The narrating mind [87], which conceals a continuously 
evolving specific Self, is in charge of narrating and sig-
nifying all experiences that are exceptional, out of the 
ordinary, not known and shared [89].
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fInAl consIDerAtIons
Today, we have to accept that the study of the mind 
and its disorders must be related to human suffering, 
but also to the new data emerging from neuroscienc-
es applied to laboratory research. This way of looking 
at the human system as at a fragmented structure, 
paying no attention to connections and processes is 
the same problem that scientists have to face when 
they work at different levels of analysis, or from a dif-
ferent new daring standpoint to generate the genetic 
foundations of many psychiatric conditions and ill-
nesses [31]. The issue here is not “what” we study 
or observe to know, but “how” we assemble the data 
coming from different experimental domains [90-91]. 
What appears to be necessary at this point of the dis-
cussion and in current scientific debates, is a shared 
epistemological approach built around notions such 
as development, process, self-organisation, self-reg-
ulation and complexity. Any observable behaviour is 
in fact the ultimate result of a sequence of processes 
that are structurally alike for the species, but imply 
different interactions and relations for the individual: 
although we live in similar conditions, each one of us 
produces a wide range of variable behaviours that can 
be explained only by observing our own evolutionary 
history and the meaning that each one attributes to 
his or her specific experience and to the relations es-
tablished over an individual’s lifespan. 
Based on what was stated above, neo-Darwinism 
still employs a reductionist-associationist methodology 
that characterises behaviourism. Instead, animal mod-
els seem to be used differently in post-Darwinism: al-
though these studies are based on micro-evolutionary 
observations, they appear to be suitable to isolate some 
specific aspects and to explore their effects, but paying 
great attention to macro-evolution and to the processes 
that determine the self-organising meaning of any phe-
nomenon as experienced by a human subject. Follow-
ing the evolutionary history and adaptive significance 
of behavioural responses, could allow us to design ex-
perimental protocols that value data quality, as well as 
their explanation. A multilevel approach that considers 
factors ranging from the genetic set up to psychological 
experience, could lead to a more holistic and effective 
investigation of mechanisms underlying brain function 
[92-94]. This work aims to contribute to the construc-
tion of an approach in clinical studies that may provide 
new strategies to more precisely investigate psychopa-
thology and psychotherapeutic interventions.
A non-classic cognitivist approach, such as the post-
rationalist one, could offer a theoretical framework for 
this multilevel approach, in addition to a noteworthy 
contribution to not only a descriptive, but an explicative 
psychopathology. Last but not least, focusing on the rel-
evance of self-referring narration and personal stories 
in both cognitive and biological development, gives 
way to effective suggestions for a cultural psychology. 
With these considerations in mind, a proposal can be 
made, aiming to launch a much broader debate on the 
proposed issues, so as to gather enough experimental 
evidence to bridge the gap between concrete scientific 
work and abstract elaborations, without neglecting the 
uniqueness and complexity of living and human sys-
tems. In other words, participating in the current sci-
entific debate on non-linearity, developmental disconti-
nuity, self-organisation and self-regulation of biological 
systems is of great interest for the author of this article, 
in order to avoid the simplification and parcelisation of 
complex living systems, and even more so of knowing 
human systems. Behavioural classic cognitivists usually 
label the post-rationalist approach as “non-scientific”, 
given its interest in personal meaning. Reacting to such 
criticism nowadays means to take on the challenge 
launched by modern theories of complexity, which in-
evitably introduce the observer in the observed system 
and accept a degree of uncertainty, having the courage 
to renounce unrealistic “faith” in absolutely exact meas-
ures and in deterministic predictabilities that belong to 
a science that has become obsolete. 
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